Jordan, Jeff University of Delaware
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929132-8
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.003.0005
 

Jeff Jordan
This chapter scrutinizes nine objections leveled against Pascal's Wager. Two of these objections are charges that Pascalian reasoning is immoral. Three might be called ‘methodological objections’, as they purport to show that the Wager argument is unsound because of this or that logical flaw. Four of the objections flow out of theological considerations. None of the nine, however, survives close scrutiny. The Jamesian Wager, in particular, escapes the nine unscathed.
Keywords: David Hume, Nietzsche, Voltaire, predestination, moral objection
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.003.0005
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