Dainton, Barry Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928884-7
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.003.0009
 

Barry Dainton
One way for an object to be metaphysically simple is to lack parts, in the manner of a geometrical point. But more complex objects and systems can be simple too, in one sense at least, provided their parts are such they cannot be separated from the wholes to which they belong. It is widely supposed, for example, that psychological systems are composed of parts that are heavily interdependent. This chapter argues that systems of experiential capacities are also heavily interdependent, and that some of these interdependencies arise from purely phenomenal considerations: ‘power holism’ flows from ‘phenomenal holism’, where the latter consists of interdependencies among the constituents of unified conscious states. The interdependencies are sufficiently deep and pervasive that the relevant systems of capacities (and hence our selves) are composed of parts that are inseparable from their wholes. Quite how inseparable depends on delicate matters of individuation.
Keywords: simplicity, interdependency, phenomenal holism, power holism, parts
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.003.0009
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