Gaynesford, Maximilian de College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928782-6







doi:10.1093/0199287821.003.0005

Maximilian de Gaynesford
Abstract: ‘The guarantee’, or the claim that any use of I is logically guaranteed against reference-failure as a matter of the meaning of the term, is a myth. If security is a semantic truth, I cannot be a genuinely singular referring term. There is no argument for ‘the guarantee’, which is independent of ‘rule theory’ and ‘independence’. Even professed advocates of ‘the guarantee’ turn out to defend a non-semantic explanation of security.

Keywords: the guarantee, reference-failure, security, logical guarantee, semantic truth, pragmatic explanation, Anscombe, Strawson,

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PART I Questions about the Meaning of I
PART II THE MEANING OF I