Abstract: This chapter develops and defends four claims about Kant's theory of truth. The first is that Kant holds that ‘the accordance of my cognition with its object’ is the strictly and analytically correct, yet metaphysically and epistemologically neutral, explication of the concept of truth. Second, that the idea of a ‘real definition’ of truth is equivalent to Kant's notion of a criterion of truth. Third, that in denying that there is a real definition of truth, Kant is not saying that there are no criteria of truth whatsoever, but rather that there is no single or univocal universal criterion of truth, because in fact there are several irreducibly different types of truth, each of which reflects a distinct human cognitive capacity, and that accordingly truth has several different, equally legitimate, and systematically specifiable criteria. Finally, some broader and deeper implications of Kant's theory of truth are explored.

Keywords: theory of truth, criterion of truth, sense of truth, truthfulness,