Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning
Philosophical Papers, Volume I
Salmon, Nathan University of California, Santa Barbara
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928471-9







doi:10.1093/0199284717.003.0011

Nathan Salmon
Abstract: For any x there can be nothing y such that there is no fact that x = y and at the same time no fact that x ( y. For if there were, then y would differ from x in this respect: that there is no fact that x is it and no fact that x is not it. In this case there is a fact that x ( y. In short, identity is always determinate. This argument is defended at length against the most developed response to date, that of Terence Parsons. The proof is also contrasted with a similar proof due to Gareth Evans.

Keywords: determinacy, Evans, identity, Leibniz, Parsons,

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PART I ONTOLOGY
Part II NECESSITY
Part III IDENTITY
Part IV PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
Part V THEORY OF MEANING AND REFERENCE