This chapter defends what is perhaps the most controversial consequence of the type/token theory: musical Platonism. Musical Platonism is the doctrine that works of music, qua types of sound-sequence-event, exist at all times, and it follows from this doctrine that the composition of a work of music is a species of invention, not discovery. Two morals emerge in the course of the chapter. First, contrary to the views of Jerrold Levinson, no version of the type/token theory can avoid musical Platonism. Second, the thesis that musical works are discovered rather than created by their composers, is eminently defensible. A conception of composition as creative discovery is outlined and defended against objections by philosophers such Levinson, Michael Morris, Stefano Predelli, R. A. Sharpe, and Saam Trivedi.
Keywords: composition, creative discovery, Jerrold Levinson, Michael Morris, Stefano Predelli, R. A. Sharpe, Saam Trivedi