Kvanvig, Jonathan L. University of Missouri
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928259-3
doi:10.1093/0199282595.003.0006
 

Jonathan L. Kvanvig
This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting intuitionistic principles of reasoning will not help avoid the paradox. It merely changes what is paradoxical from a lost distinction between known truth and knowable truth, to a lost distinction between unknown truth and unknowable truth. Since paradox remains in both cases, the solution to the paradox must be found elsewhere.
Keywords: paradox, intuitionism, logic, truth, holistic coherence, John Pollock
doi:10.1093/0199282595.003.0006
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