Kvanvig, Jonathan L. University of Missouri
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928259-3
doi:10.1093/0199282595.003.0005
 

Jonathan L. Kvanvig
This chapter examines the idea that the logical principles governing the knowledge operator are the root cause of the paradox. There are two such principles: the first is that knowledge implies truth, and the second is that knowledge distributes over conjunction, so that knowledge of a conjunction constitutes knowledge of the conjuncts. It is argued that the paradox cannot be avoided by questioning these principles.
Keywords: knowledge operator, truth, conjunction, paradox, Fred Dretske, Robert Nozick, closure
doi:10.1093/0199282595.003.0005
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