Abstract: Science represents natural phenomena by means of theories, as well as in many concrete ways by such means as pictures, graphs, table-top models, and computer simulations. This book begins with an inquiry into the nature of representation in general, drawing on such diverse sources as Plato's dialogues, the development of perspectival drawing in the Renaissance, and the geometric styles of modeling in modern physics. Starting with Mach's and Poincaré's analyses of measurement and Reichenbach's ‘problem of coordination’, this book presents a view of measurement outcomes as representations achieved in a process of mutual stabilization of theory and empirical inquiry. With respect to the theories of contemporary science, the book defends an empiricist structuralist version of the ‘picture theory’ of science, compatible with a constructive empiricist view, through an inquiry into the paradoxes that came to light in 20th-century philosophies of science. It is argued that indexicality enters irreducibly into the conditions of use and application of measurement, models, and theories. The book concludes with an analysis of the complex relationship between appearance and reality in the scientific world-picture, arguing against the completeness criterion that demands a derivation of the appearances from the theoretically postulated reality.

Keywords: representation, Mach, measurement, model, Poincaré, picture theory of science, structuralism, empiricism, structural realism, philosophy of science