Gregoric, Pavel Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927737-7
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0007
 

Pavel Gregoric
One of the main purposes of De Anima III.1 is to show that there can be no sense in addition to the five familiar ones — that is, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Aristotle supplies an argument in which he concludes for the common perceptibles — such as change, shape, or magnitude — ‘we have an aisthesin koinen’. This is usually taken to imply that the common perceptibles are perceived by the common sense. The logic and the terminology of Aristotle's argument is analysed in this chapter, and it is shown that the phrase does not in fact refer to any higher-order perceptual capacity, but rather it describes an aspect of properly functioning individual senses, namely their sensitivity to the common perceptibles. This interpretation respects the logic of Aristotle's argument and accommodates the facts that the key phrase occurs without the definite article and in reverse word order.
Keywords: De Anima, common sense, senses, common perceptibles, perception, aisthesis koine
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0007
Quick Search Form
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Part I The Framework
Part II The Terminology
Part III Functions of the Common Sense