Gregoric, Pavel Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927737-7
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0010
 

Pavel Gregoric
This chapter examines whether De Anima 431 b 5 contains an elliptical occurrence of the phrase ‘common sense’, and if so, what is its exact reference. As a starting point, it is assumed that the main purpose of the passage is to show that the thinking capacity of the soul can determine what is to be pursued and avoided both in the presence and in the absence of perception. In the presence of perception, the thinking capacity determines what is to be pursued and avoided with respect to things that are given to us by perception. There are good reasons to take the phrase ‘ommon sense’ with reference to a non-rational cognitive ability by which accidental perceptibles, such as alarm signals, are grasped, and this should be identified with the sensory capacity of the soul.
Keywords: De Anima, common sense, accidental perceptibles, rational, non-rational, cognitive capacities, elliptical occurrence, perception
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.003.0010
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Part I The Framework
Part II The Terminology
Part III Functions of the Common Sense