Second Philosophy
A Naturalistic Method
Maddy, Penelope University of California, Irvine
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927366-9
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0018
 

Penelope Maddy
This chapter argues that ordinary physical objects stand in relations, with ground-consequent dependencies, and that these objects and relations admit of vague boundaries — all as in an abstract KF-structure. However, given our best understanding of quantum mechanics, the world in the small doesn't consist of spatiotemporal objects of the usual sort, and even the bare notion of an individual object is problematic; similar troubles arise for properties and relations and ground-consequent dependencies. Thus, the Second Philosopher fine-tunes the first component of her account to read: a rudimentary logic is true of the world insofar as it is a KF-world, and in many but not all respects, it is.
Keywords: KF-structure, ground-consequent dependencies, objects-in-relations, quantum mechanics, rudimentary logic, vagueness
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0018
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Part I What is Second Philosophy?
Part II The Second Philosopher at Work
Part III The Second Philosophy of Logic
Part IV Second Philosophy and Mathematics