Kant's two-level scheme allows him to say two things at once: speaking empirically, logic is objectively true (empirically real) because of the structure of the world (e.g., because it's made up of objects-with-properties, standing in ground-consequent relations); speaking transcendentally, logic is true because of the necessary structure of any discursive intellect (transcendentally ideal). To make use of these attractive ideas, the Second Philosopher needs to combine them on one level: as a first approximation, she proposes that a rudimentary logic is true of the world because of its structural features, that humans believe this logic because their cognitive apparatus allow them to detect those structural features, and humans are so-configured because the world is so-structured. This chapter spells out the structural features at work here, beginning from Kant's categories and modifying in light of Frege's work (to reach the notion of a ‘KF-structure’).
Keywords: discursive intellect, empirical realism, Frege, Kant, KF-structure, logical truth, rudimentary logic, transcendental idealism, two-level views