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Swinburne, Richard
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927167-2 |
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doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.003.0014
Abstract: Large numbers of people have religious experiences in the sense of experiences which seem to them to be experiences of God. It is a basic epistemological principle, the principle of credulity, that — in absence of counter-evidence — we should believe that things are as they seem to be. The only kind of counter-evidence which would tend to show a religious experience not to be veridical would be any evidence tending to show that there is no God. In the absence of any such evidence, any religious experience is evidence for the subject (and via his testimony, for others) of the existence of God.
Keywords: principle of credulity, evidence, credulity, religious experience,
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