Bayesian Epistemology
Bovens, Luc,
Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder
Hartmann, Stephan,
London School of Economics
Print publication date: 2004
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926975-4 doi:10.1093/0199269750.001.0001 |
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Abstract:
Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more confident one ought to be in its content, ceteris paribus. An impossibility result shows that there cannot exist a coherence ordering. A coherence quasi-ordering can be constructed that respects this claim and is relevant to scientific-theory choice. Bayesian-Network models of the reliability of information sources are made applicable to Condorcet-style jury voting, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda puzzle, the variety-of-evidence thesis, the Duhem–Quine thesis, and the informational value of testimony.
Keywords: Bayesian Networks, coherence measures, coherence theory of justification, Condorcet Jury Theorem, Duhem–Quine thesis, evidence, Linda puzzle, probabilistic models, reliability, scientific-theory choice, testimony, Tversky and Kahneman, variety-of-evidence thesis Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
1.
Information
2.
Coherence
3.
Reliability
4.
Confirmation
5.
Testimony
Epilogue
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
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