Abstract: Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more confident one ought to be in its content, ceteris paribus. An impossibility result shows that there cannot exist a coherence ordering. A coherence quasi-ordering can be constructed that respects this claim and is relevant to scientific-theory choice. Bayesian-Network models of the reliability of information sources are made applicable to Condorcet-style jury voting, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda puzzle, the variety-of-evidence thesis, the Duhem–Quine thesis, and the informational value of testimony.

Keywords: Bayesian Networks, coherence measures, coherence theory of justification, Condorcet Jury Theorem, Duhem–Quine thesis, evidence, Linda puzzle, probabilistic models, reliability, scientific-theory choice, testimony, Tversky and Kahneman, variety-of-evidence thesis