Towards Non-Being
The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality
Priest, Graham Universities of Melbourne and St Andrews
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926254-0
doi:10.1093/0199262543.003.0005
Graham Priest
Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Quine and Russell on non-existent objects. Their arguments aim to show that Meinong’s notion of such objects is incoherent. Quine’s well known argument about the fat man in the doorway is discussed and rejected.
Keywords: W.V.O. Quine, Bertrand Russell, A. Meinong,
doi:10.1093/0199262543.003.0005
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Part I Semantics for Intentionality
Part II In Defence of Non-Being