O'Brien, Lucy Department of Philosophy, University College London
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926148-2
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0006
 

Lucy O'Brien
This chapter attempted to characterize the nature of an agent's awareness. It argues that an agent's awareness is a familiar feature of active psychological phenomena rather than passive ones, and is therefore a feature of paradigm thoughts and utterances; an agent's awareness is an awareness we can have without conceptualizing or self-ascribing it; and that agent's awareness is a feature of thoughts and utterances that the thought or utterance has by virtue of its mode of occurrence.
Keywords: agent's awareness, self-knowledge, first-order intentionalist approach, non-content-based account, self-awareness, control
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0006
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Part I First-Person Reference
Part II Actions and Self-Knowledge