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O'Brien, Lucy
Department of Philosophy, University College London
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926148-2 |
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doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0004
Abstract: This chapter examines the self-reference rule (SSR), which states that ‘I’ refers to the subject who produced it. In particular, it analyses the suggestion that SRR is able to provide a satisfactory account of first-person reference, and it also examines the reductionist approach to first-person reference. It is argued that while we may concede that there may be a kind of basic reflexive reference that the approach explains, there is nevertheless an element of self consciousness in the kind of first-person reference under consideration which the approach fails to capture.
Keywords: first-person reference, reductionist approach, SSR, I, subject,
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