O'Brien, Lucy Department of Philosophy, University College London
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926148-2
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0004
 

Lucy O'Brien
This chapter examines the self-reference rule (SSR), which states that ‘I’ refers to the subject who produced it. In particular, it analyses the suggestion that SRR is able to provide a satisfactory account of first-person reference, and it also examines the reductionist approach to first-person reference. It is argued that while we may concede that there may be a kind of basic reflexive reference that the approach explains, there is nevertheless an element of self consciousness in the kind of first-person reference under consideration which the approach fails to capture.
Keywords: first-person reference, reductionist approach, SSR, I, subject
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0004
Quick Search Form
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Part I First-Person Reference
Part II Actions and Self-Knowledge