O'Brien, Lucy Department of Philosophy, University College London
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926148-2







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0010

Lucy O'Brien
Abstract: This chapter explores the claim that bodily awareness is a perceptual faculty or, more realistically, set of faculties. It shows that there are a number of ways to construe the widely accepted claim that bodily awareness is a perceptual faculty. Bodily awareness can be construed as a faculty which enables us to perceive properties of our bodies — its shape, location, movement, as well as phenomenal pain properties, tickle properties, and the like. Unless one is a sceptic about secondary properties, or has a specific reason for thinking that there could not be phenomenal perceptible properties of our bodies, there is no impediment to doing so.

Keywords: bodily awareness, perceptual faculty, tickle properties, location, movement, pain properties,

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Part I First-Person Reference
Part II Actions and Self-Knowledge