Descartes's Theory of Mind
Clarke, Desmond,
Department of Philosophy, University College, Cork, Ireland
Print publication date: 2003
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926123-9 doi:10.1093/0199261237.001.0001 |
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Abstract:
Descartes argues that no explanation of any phenomenon may assume or merely re-describe what needs to be explained. He cannot, therefore, propose substance dualism as a theory of mind. To explain mental activities such as sensation, memory, or imagination, one must hypothesize how they result from interaction between the environment, the senses, and the processing of the brain. Descartes initiated such a naturalized account. However, given the state of neurology in the seventeenth century, his efforts were doomed. The failure to construct a scientific theory that bridges the theoretical gap between mental events and matter (as understood by Descartes) results, by default, in a property dualism that marks the limits of his scientific efforts.
Keywords: Descartes, dualism, explanation, imagination, matter, memory, sensation, substance, theory of mind Table of Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1.
Cartesian Explanation
Chapter 2.
Sensation: Ideas as Brain Patterns
Chapter 3.
Imagination and Memory
Chapter 4.
Passions of the Soul
Chapter 5.
The Will as a Power of Self-Determination
Chapter 6.
Human Language
Chapter 7.
Describing Thought: The Subjective View
Chapter 8.
Descartes's Use of the Concept of Substance
Chapter 9.
Property Dualism
Bibliography
Index
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