Moral Realism
A Defence
Shafer-Landau, Russ Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Print publication date: 2003 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925975-5
doi:10.1093/0199259755.003.0002
Russ Shafer-Landau
Sets out the contours of the moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and provides an extended series of arguments against non-cognitivism and expressivism. Seeks to establish a presumptive case for moral cognitivism.
Keywords: cognitivism, expressivism, moral realism, non-cognitivism,
doi:10.1093/0199259755.003.0002
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Part I Realism And Its Critics
Part II Moral Metaphysics
Part III Moral Motivation
Part IV Moral Reasons
Part V Moral Knowledge