A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals
Bennett, Jonathan,
formerly Professor of Philosophy, Syracuse University
Print publication date: 2003
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925887-1 doi:10.1093/0199258872.001.0001 |
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Abstract:
Conditionals are of two basic kinds, often called ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’. This book expounds and evaluates the main literature about each kind. It eventually defends the view of Adams and Edgington that indicatives are devices for expressing subjective probabilities, and the view of Stalnaker and Lewis that subjunctives are statements about close possible worlds. But it also discusses other views, e.g. that indicatives are really material conditionals, and Goodman's approach to subjunctives.
Keywords: Adams, conditionals, Edgington, Goodman, indicative conditionals, Lewis, material conditionals, metaphysics, philosophy of language, possible worlds, probability, Stalnaker, subjunctive Table of Contents
Preface
1.
Introduction
2.
The Material Conditional: Grice
3.
The Material Conditional: Jackson
4.
The Equation
5.
The Equation Attacked
6.
The Subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals
7.
Indicative Conditionals Lack Truth Values
8.
Uses of Indicative Conditionals
9.
The Logic of Indicative Conditionals
10.
Subjunctive Conditionals—First Steps
11.
The Competition for ‘Closest’
12.
Unrolling from the Antecedent Time
13.
Forks
14.
Reflections on Legality
15.
Truth at the Actual World
16.
Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability
17.
‘Even if . . . ’
18.
Backward Subjunctive Conditionals
19.
Subjunctive Conditionals and Time's Arrow
20.
Support Theories
21.
The Need for Worlds
22.
Relating the Two Kinds of Conditional
23.
Unifying the Two Kinds of Conditional
Bibliography
Index
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