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Cullity, Garrett
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925811-6 doi:10.1093/0199258112.003.0008 |
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Showing that the Extreme Demand can be rejected from an appropriately impartial point of view would constitute a decisive objection to it. This would undermine the case for thinking that it could be a demand of either fairness or beneficence. An ‘appropriately’ impartial point of view, for the purposes of this argument, is a point of view of impartial concern for other people’s interests.
Keywords: beneficence, demands of morality, fairness, impartiality, interests,
doi:10.1093/0199258112.003.0008
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