O'Shaughnessy, Brian Emeritus Reader in Philosophy, King's College London
Print publication date: 2003 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925672-3
doi:10.1093/0199256721.003.0009
 

Brian O'Shaughnessy
The two functions of the Attention—providing psychic space for experiences, and bringing phenomenal existents to consciousness—are diverse functions of a unitary phenomenon. And so perception simply is awareness or consciousness or experience of an existent object, and cannot be an idiosyncratic indefinable capacity, being explicated in universal a priori-given terms, viz. object and awareness. But why should not any intentionally directed experience that is directed onto a phenomenal reality be rated a perception? It is because ‘aware of’ has the same meaning in ‘Perception is awareness of an existent’ and ‘We are aware of the occupants of the Attention’, and a different meaning in ‘We are aware of any actually existing object of an intentionally directed experience’. For example, we are aware of sounds and anxiety as we are not aware of actual events that are at once unperceived-by-us but visualized or thought-of by us.
Keywords: Attention, awareness, consciousness, experience, meaning, object of awareness, object of perception
doi:10.1093/0199256721.003.0009
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Part I Consciousness
Part II The Attention and Perception
Part III Seeing
Part IV Perception and the Body