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Williamson, Timothy
Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2002 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925656-3 |
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doi:10.1093/019925656X.003.0006
Abstract: The anti-luminosity argument is used to refute the KK principle that if one knows and one knows that one knows, or at least is in a position to know that one knows. Further iterations of knowledge are shown to involve similar cognitive gaps. The underlying phenomenon is diagnosed in terms of the need for a margin for error in knowledge. It is related to a family of ideas such as safety, reliability, robustness, stability, and close or easy possibility. The account is extended to knowledge of what others know.
Keywords: easy possibility, error, iteration, KK principle, Margin, reliability, robustness, safety, stability,
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