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Williamson, Timothy
Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2002 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925656-3 |
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doi:10.1093/019925656X.003.0010
Abstract: This chapter argues that one's total evidence is simply one's total knowledge. Evidence is primarily relevant to evaluating propositions of whose truth values one is ignorant. Since knowledge is not to be analysed in terms of justification, there is no circularity in using knowledge to analyse justification by evidence. Thus, the attempt to reorient epistemology towards justification rather than knowledge is a mistake. The need for evidence to be propositional is emphasized by consideration of its role in falsification, inference to the best explanation, and Bayesian confirmation.
Keywords: analysis, Bayesian, best explanation, circularity, confirmation, evidence, inference, justification,
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