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Conee, Earl
Department of Philosophy
University of Rochester
NY
Feldman, Richard
Department of Philosophy
University of Rochester
NY
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925372-2 doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0004 |
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Endeavors to give a satisfactory account of the difference between internalist and externalist theories in epistemology. The internalist perspective, particularly in its evidentialist incarnations, is argued for and defended against recent objections. It is also suggested that epistemology is not best pursued by arguing about the boundaries of this division or arguing about the merits of everything on either side.
Keywords: deontology, evidence, externalism, Alvin Goldman, higher-order beliefs, internalism, memory,
doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0004
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