Conee, Earl Department of Philosophy University of Rochester NY
Feldman, Richard Department of Philosophy University of Rochester NY
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925372-2
doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0002
 

Earl Conee
Philosophers have thought that there are insuperable limits to rationally opposing skepticism, to pursuing epistemological investigations without substantial presuppositions, or to explaining knowledge in general. In this chapter, it is argued that there are no such constraints on an evidentialist approach.
Keywords: circularity, evidence, problem of the criterion, reliabilism, Roderick Chisholm, self-refutation, skepticism, Barry Stroud
doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0002
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Part I General Issues
Part II Critical Discussions
Part III Developments and Applications