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Conee, Earl
Department of Philosophy
University of Rochester
NY
Feldman, Richard
Department of Philosophy
University of Rochester
NY
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925372-2 doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0010 |
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Studies various conceptions of what constitutes a person's evidence. The most inclusive views count as evidence possessed everything that is stored in one's memory. A much more restrictive view, which is defended here, is that the evidence someone has at a time is limited to what the person is thinking of at the time. It is also argued that the problem of explaining what it is to have evidence is not a problem faced by all theories of justification, not evidentialism alone.
Keywords: conscious evidence, current-state rationality, dispositional knowledge, justification, memory,
doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0010
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