Evidentialism
Essays in Epistemology
Conee, Earl Department of Philosophy University of Rochester NY
Feldman, Richard Department of Philosophy University of Rochester NY
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925372-2
doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0010
Richard Feldman
Studies various conceptions of what constitutes a person's evidence. The most inclusive views count as evidence possessed everything that is stored in one's memory. A much more restrictive view, which is defended here, is that the evidence someone has at a time is limited to what the person is thinking of at the time. It is also argued that the problem of explaining what it is to have evidence is not a problem faced by all theories of justification, not evidentialism alone.
Keywords: conscious evidence, current-state rationality, dispositional knowledge, justification, memory,
doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0010
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Part I General Issues
Part II Critical Discussions
Part III Developments and Applications