Ways a World Might Be
Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays
Stalnaker, Robert C. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Print publication date: 2003 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925148-3
doi:10.1093/0199251487.003.0015
Robert C. Stalnaker
This paper explores the conception of self proposed by Thomas Nagel. It is argued that more must be said to clarify the place of a subjective point of view in the objective world than is said by semantic diagnosis. The paper discusses the semantic diagnosis and Nagel’s reasons for finding it unsatisfactory. A metaphysical solution to the problem is presented and the place of subjective point of view in an objective world is explained. It is then analyses whether the austere view of contextual or subjective information can account for information about the qualitative character of experience.
Keywords: Thomas Nagel, objective self, subjective view, semantic diagnosis, conception,
doi:10.1093/0199251487.003.0015
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Part1 Ways and Worlds
Part II Carving up Logical Space
Part III Identity in and across Possible Worlds
Part IV Semantics, Metasemantics, and Metaphysics
Part V Subjective Possibilities