Wedgwood, Ralph Merton College, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925131-5
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.003.0001
 

Ralph Wedgwood
This chapter first introduces one of the main ideas of the book — that the normativity of the intentional is the ‘key to metaethics’. It is suggested that this idea naturally captures a kind of Platonism about the normative. It then compares the theory that is outlined in the rest of the book with the best-known alternative theories (such as expressivist and constructivist theories, the theories built around a ‘conceptual analysis’ of normative concepts, the naturalist theory that is known as ‘Cornell moral realism’, and quietist forms of realism). Finally, it gives a summary of the contents of later chapters, and makes some comments on the philosophical method that is used in the rest of the book.
Keywords: metaethics, normativity, intentional, Platonism, expressivism, constructivism, conceptual analysis, naturalism, Cornell moral realism, quietism
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.003.0001
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Part I The Semantics of Normative Thought and Discourse
Part II The Metaphysics of Normative Facts
Part III The Epistemology of Normative Belief