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Subject: Philosophy  Book Title: Moral Writings
Moral Writings
Prichard, H. A. , (1871-1947) White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University
MacAdam, Jim (Editor), Professor Emeritus, Trent University, Canada
Print publication date: 2002
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925019-6
doi:10.1093/0199250197.001.0001
 
Abstract: Develops Prichard's intuitionist position on moral philosophy. As a realist, he maintains that through direct perception in particular cases, we come to have knowledge of universals. To questions about moral obligation, he argues that no single principle explains why right acts are right, that is to say, why certain acts are obligatory. Prichard rejects any link between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’, maintaining that the rightness of action depends not upon what is good, nor upon our own good, nor upon what we believe is good, nor upon what we desire. In these essays, Prichard analyses the views of Plato, Aristotle, Green, Sidgwick, Kant, and others. Only the last of these thinkers, according to Prichard, steers clear of those views that Prichard finds to be in error since Kant also distinguishes between what is right and what is good.

Keywords: obligation, Aristotle, desire, good, intuitionism, Kant, perception, Plato, realism, right
Table of Contents
1.. What Is the Basis of Moral Obligation?
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2.. Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
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3.. Duty and Interest
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4.. Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
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5.. A Conflict of Duties
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6.. Duty and Ignorance of Fact
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7.. The Meaning of 0x001f000x0003b30x0003b10x0003b80x001f790x0003bd In the Ethics of Aristotle
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8.. Manuscript on Morals
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9.. Moral Obligation
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10.. Green: Political Obligation
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11.. The Object of a Desire
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12.. The Obligation to Keep a Promise
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13.. Exchanging
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14.. The Time of an Obligation
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15.. The Psychology of Willing
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16.. Acting, Willing, Desiring
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17.. ‘Ought’
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Appendix
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Bibliography
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Index
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doi:10.1093/0199250197.001.0001
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