Prichard, H. A.
, (1871-1947) White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University
MacAdam, Jim
(Editor), Professor Emeritus, Trent University, Canada
Print publication date: 2002
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925019-6
doi:10.1093/0199250197.001.0001
Abstract:
Develops Prichard's intuitionist position on moral philosophy. As a realist, he maintains that through direct perception in particular cases, we come to have knowledge of universals. To questions about moral obligation, he argues that no single principle explains why right acts are right, that is to say, why certain acts are obligatory. Prichard rejects any link between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’, maintaining that the rightness of action depends not upon what is good, nor upon our own good, nor upon what we believe is good, nor upon what we desire. In these essays, Prichard analyses the views of Plato, Aristotle, Green, Sidgwick, Kant, and others. Only the last of these thinkers, according to Prichard, steers clear of those views that Prichard finds to be in error since Kant also distinguishes between what is right and what is good.