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Coope, Ursula
Birkbeck College, University of London
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924790-5 |
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doi:10.1093/0199247900.003.0009
Abstract: Aristotle says that although earlier and later nows are different, there is also a way in which they are the same. He compares the way in which earlier and later nows are the same but different to the way in which something in motion is, during its motion, the same and yet different. This chapter explains this comparison. It argues that by ‘moving thing’, Aristotle means an odd entity: a thing defined as in motion. An example would be Coriscos-moving-from-A-to-B. In comparing the now to an entity of this sort, Aristotle is not saying that the now is something that moves. His view is that there is a way in which all nows are the same: that by being which the now is (ho pote on esti) is the same. In Aristotle’s view, nows are only countable in virtue of the fact that they are the same in this way.
Keywords: nows, countable, moving thing, moving now, Coriscos, ho pote n,
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