Coope, Ursula Birkbeck College, University of London
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924790-5
doi:10.1093/0199247900.003.0011
 

Ursula Coope
At the end of his account, Aristotle raises a puzzle about whether or not there could be time if there were no ensouled beings. It is argued that his answer to this puzzle is that time depends upon the soul in a way in which change does not. Aristotle puts this by saying that if there were no souls, there could not be time, but there might perhaps be change. This chapter explains why Aristotle’s definition of time leads him to this conclusion. It contends that he views time as essentially countable, and because of this, could not exist in the absence of beings able to count. Moreover, Aristotle’s view implies, that time is not just essentially countable but also essentially counted. Because of the way in which time is a number, it can only be countable if it is in fact counted.
Keywords: soul, change countable, colours, number
doi:10.1093/0199247900.003.0011
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PART I INTRODUCTORY PUZZLES AND THE STARTING POINTS OF INQUIRY
PART II TIME'S DEPENDENCE ON CHANGE
PART III TIME AS A NUMBER AND TIME AS A MEASURE
PART IV THE SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE OF TIMES AND NOWS
PART V TWO CONSEQUENCES OF ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF TIME