Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy
Bobzien, Susanne,
Professor of Philosophy, Yale University
Print publication date: 2001
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924767-7 doi:10.1093/0199247676.001.0001 |
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Abstract:
This book is a comprehensive study of the Stoic theory of causal and teleological determinism. It identifies the main problems the Stoics addressed, reconstructs the theory, and explores how they squared their determinism with their conceptions of possibility, action, freedom, and moral responsibility, and how they defended it against objections and criticism by other philosophers. It shows how the Stoics distinguished their causal determinism from ancient theories of logical determinism, fatalism, and necessitarianism, and shows that they developed a compatibilist theory with a rationalist component. Along the way many other related aspects of Stoic thought are discussed, including their views on the predictability of the future, the role of empirical sciences, character development, and moral freedom. The main Stoic theory of causal determinism goes back to the Stoic Chrysippus. There are some interesting developments of the theory in the later Stoa.
Keywords: causal determinism, character, Chrysippus, compatibilism, determinism, fatalism, freedom, history of philosophy, logical determinism, moral responsibility, Stoicism, teleological determinism Table of Contents
Introduction
1.
Determinism and Fate
2.
Two Chrysippean Arguments for Causal Determinism
3.
Modality, Determinism, and Freedom
4.
Divination, Modality, and Universal Regularity
5.
Fate, Action, and Motivation: The Idle Argument
6.
Determinism and Moral Responsibility: Chrysippus' Compatibilism
7.
Freedom and That Which Depends on Us: Epictetus and Early Stoics
8.
A Later Stoic Theory of Compatibilism
Bibliography
Index
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