Abstract: This book develops Resemblance Nominalism as a solution to the Problem of Universals. It argues that the Problem of Universals is a problem about the truthmakers of sentences attributing sparse, lowest determinate properties to particulars. According to Resemblance Nominalism, neither universals nor tropes exist, and what makes true that a certain particular has a certain (sparse, lowest determinate) property has to do with it resembling certain other particulars. The book develops answers and solutions to many objections and difficulties faced by Resemblance Nominalism: Russell's infinite regress, the coextension difficulty, the imperfect community difficulty, the companionship difficulty, and others. The book argues, on methodological considerations, that Resemblance Nominalism is the best solution to the Problem of Universals.

Keywords: Armstrong, classes, Problem of Universals, properties, universals, tropes