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Broome, John
White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924376-1 doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0005 |
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This chapter defines a quantitative notion of a person’s lifetime wellbeing. It does so on the basis of betterness among uncertain prospects, using expected utility theory (which the chapter explains) and a theorem of John Harsanyi. It adopts the assumption of Daniel Bernoulli that wellbeing is risk-neutral. It gives an account of interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing.
Keywords: quantities of wellbeing, Harsanyi, Bernoulli, risk neutrality, interpersonal comparisons, expected utility theory,
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0005
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