Broome, John White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924376-1
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0004
 

John Broome
This chapter discusses three debated features of goodness. It argues that the relation of betterness is necessarily transitive. It compares the ideas of goodness overall, goodness for a person, and goodness for a person at a time. It considers whether goodness must always be relative to a standpoint, and whether it is necessarily impartial.
Keywords: transitivity of betterness, personal good, temporal good, wellbeing, relative goodness, impartial value
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0004
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