Broome, John White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924376-1
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0012
 

John Broome
This chapter gives qualified support to a fourth approach to incorporating the neutrality intuition. It considers the possibility that the betterness relation is indeterminate, but in the end supports the related but different view that betterness is vague. It adopts the supervaluation account of vagueness, which opens the way to continuing the development of the theory of weighing lives.
Keywords: incommensurability, vagueness, vague betterness, vague relations, supervaluation
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0012
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