Broome, John
White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924376-1
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0011
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924376-1
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0011
11 Nonstandard Betterness
This chapter considers and rejects three approaches to incorporating the neutrality intuition into a theory of value. The first is to suppose that betterness might be intransitive. The second is to suppose that betterness might be conditional in a particular sense. The third is to suppose that betterness can only be understood relative to a particular population.
Keywords: transitivity of betterness, conditional goodness, relative goodness
Keywords: transitivity of betterness, conditional goodness, relative goodness
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0011
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