Broome, John White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924376-1
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0010
John Broome
This chapter demonstrates how the assumptions made so far in the book imply that there is a single neutral level for existence. That is, there is a single level of wellbeing such that adding a person at that level is neither better nor worse than not adding her. It explains how this conclusion conflicts strongly with an intuition shared by many people: the ‘neutrality intuition’ that adding a person to the world’s population is generally ethically neutral. It uses examples such as the mere addition paradox. It outlines various ways in which the conflict with intuition might be circumvented.
Keywords: mere addition paradox, neutral level, neutrality intuition, critical level,
doi:10.1093/019924376X.003.0010
Quick Search Form

 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast