Kantian Humility
Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves
Langton, Rae Member of the Philosophy Department, University of Sheffield
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924317-4







doi:10.1093/0199243174.003.0007

Rae Langton
Abstract: Humility does follow from Receptivity—given Irreducibility. For Leibniz, Reducibility is the mirror that allows relations to be taken as intrinsic properties, phenomena to be taken as monads: reducibility permits (confused) acquaintance of things in themselves, since through perceptual access to phenomenal relations, we gain access to intrinsic properties. When Kant denies reducibility, that mirror is broken: Receptivity says we have knowledge only of what affects us; Distinction says that what affects us are the relational, causal powers of substance; Irreducibility says that it is ‘not through its own intrinsic properties’ that substance affects us. Humility follows: ‘we have no insight whatsoever into the intrinsic nature of things’. Kant's commitment to Irreducibility persisted beyond early work, extending throughout his philosophical career.

Keywords: Humility, intrinsic properties, Irreducibility, Kant, Leibniz, mirror, monad, phenomena, Receptivity, things in themselves,

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