Knowing Our Own Minds
Wright, Crispin (Editor),
Fellow of the British Academy and Professor of Logic and Metaphysics,
University of St Andrews
Smith, Barry C. (Editor),
Lecturer in Philosophy,
Birkbeck College, London
Macdonald, Cynthia (Editor),
Professor of Philosophy,
University of Canterbury
Print publication date: 2000
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924140-8 doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001 |
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Abstract:
Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers, and a topic of special relevance to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. This volume provides an important overview of recent work on the subject by bringing together original essays by a number of philosophers. Many of the papers have become standard reference items in this literature.Knowledge of one's own thoughts and sensations, beliefs and desires, intentions and meanings is characteristically different from knowledge of others’ minds: it is typically immediate, authoritative, and salient. The first six chapters examine philosophical questions raised by these features of self-knowledge. The next two chapters look at the role of our knowledge of our own psychological states in our functioning as rational agents. The third group of chapters examine the prima facie tension between the distinctive characteristics of self-knowledge and philosophical claims that mental content is externally determined by social and environmental conditions. The last two chapters extend the discussion to knowledge of what one means in speaking a language.
Keywords: avowals, Cartesianism, externalism, first-person authority, inner states, introspection, mental states, privileged access, self-ascription, self-knowledge Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
1.
Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy
2.
Response to Crispin Wright
3.
Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge
4.
An Eye Directed Outward
5.
Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge
6.
Self-Knowledge: Special Access Versus Artefact of Grammar—A Dichotomy Rejected
7.
Self-Knowledge and Resentment
8.
Reason and the First Person
9.
What the Externalist Can Know A Priori
10.
Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge
11.
Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant
12.
First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs
13.
The Simple Theory of Colour and the Transparency of Sense Experience
14.
On Knowing One's Own Language
15.
On Knowing One's Own Language
Index
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