New Essays on the A Priori
Boghossian, Paul Professor of Philosophy, New York University
Peacocke, Christopher Professor of Philosophy, New York University
Print publication date: 2000 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924127-9




4 A Priori Knowledge
doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0004

Philip Kitcher
Abstract: Philip Kitcher defends his rejection of the thesis that mathematical knowledge is possible if such knowledge is a priori against a number of objections. His main line of argument is to suggest a property that follows deductively from apriority, and then to argue that propositions cannot possess such a property.

Keywords: a priori knowledge, mathematical knowledge, Philip Kitcher, property, propositions,

You have access to the abstract for this item.     You have access to the full text for this item.


 
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice © Oxford University Press, . All rights reserved.
Quick Search Form

Contents
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Full Book Contents
1 Introduction
2 Frege on Apriority
3 Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori
4 A Priori Knowledge Revisited
5 Naturalism and the A Priori
6 Apriority as an Evaluative Notion
7 Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority
8 A Priori Rules: Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic
9 Apriority and Existence
10 Knowledge of Logic
11 Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism
12 Implicit Definition and the A Priori
13 Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori
14 The Status of Logic
15 Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo-Kantian Perspective
16 Externalism and Armchair Knowledge
17 Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empricial Facts
18 The Psychophysical Nexus
Index
 
Return to top of list
SUBSCRIBER