Abstract: The question of what it is to possess the concept of perception is also of interest to the philosophy of mind more generally. A perceiving thinker who has the capacity to appreciate that others also perceive is on the way to thinking of others as subjects like himself — to thinking of another person as ‘another I’, in Zeno's phrase. The chapter begins by considering the first-person case, that in which a thinker judges that he himself sees. After proposing a treatment of the first-person case, and some of its epistemic and metaphysical ramifications, it goes on to compare it with Evans's account. It discusses the relation between first-person and third-person ascription, and explains some developmental phenomena. Finally, the extension of the model presented to the self-ascription and other-ascription of action and intentionality is discussed.

Keywords: concept of perception, Aristotle, Evans, first person, third person, thinker, self-ascription, action,