Truth in Virtue of Meaning
A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
Russell, Gillian Washington University in St Louis
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-923219-2







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0007

Gillian Russell
Abstract: This chapter responds to some further arguments against analyticity, including the Regress Argument, arguments based on the widespread phenomenon of vagueness, arguments from semantic externalism and scepticism about meaning and arguments based on individual sentences, such as ‘all cats are animals’ and ‘gold is yellow’.

Keywords: regress argument, rules of implication, indeterminacy of translation, underdetermination, semantic externalism, vagueness, scepticism,

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Part I The Positive View
Part II A Defense
Part III Work for Epistemologists