Truth in Virtue of Meaning
A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
Russell, Gillian Washington University in St Louis
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-923219-2
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0001
 

Gillian Russell
This chapter introduces and motivates study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and provides a brief history of that distinction. It also contains some preliminaries which will be of use in the rest of the book.
Keywords: analytic/synthetic distinction, truth, virtue of meaning, semantic externalism, analyticity, contingent analytic
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0001
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Part I The Positive View
Part II A Defense
Part III Work for Epistemologists