Grounding Concepts
An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge
Jenkins, C. S. University of Nottingham
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-923157-7







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.003.0008

Caroline Jenkins
Abstract: This chapter focuses on objections to the claim that arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. It argues that the most common form of objection to projects of this type is based upon a failure to appreciate that it is even possible that empirical input grounds our arithmetical concepts. It traces this view through an illustrative selection of influential philosophers: Kant, C. I. Lewis, Ayer, Quine, and Fodor.

Keywords: Thinking Too Big, Objections, Kant, C. I. Lewis, Ayer, Quine, Fodor,

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Part I Realism and Knowledge
Part II An Epistemology for Arithmetic
Part III Objections