Grounding Concepts
An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge
Jenkins, C. S. University of Nottingham
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-923157-7







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.003.0002

Caroline Jenkins
Abstract: This chapter aims to determine in exactly what sense we should be ‘realists’ about arithmetic, that is, exactly what kind of arithmetical ‘independence’ from the mind we should be interested in defending. It argues that taking what is called in this chapter ‘modal independence’ as characteristic of realism is a mistake, and that we should instead characterize realism in terms of is called in this chapter ‘essential independence’.

Keywords: independence, modal, essential, mind, quasi-realism,

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Part I Realism and Knowledge
Part II An Epistemology for Arithmetic
Part III Objections