Oxford Scholarship Online: Disjunctivism

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Disjunctivism Perception, Action, Knowledge Haddock, Adrian University of Stirling Macpherson, Fiona University of Glasgow Print publication date: 2008 (this edition) Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-923154-6
13 In Defence of Disjunctivism doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0014 Ram Neta Abstract: McDowell has offered a particular epistemological argument in favour of one version of disjunctivism about perception. This argument has been prominently criticized by Crispin Wright, and the conclusion of the argument has been prominently criticized by Mark Johnston. This chapter rebuts both of those criticisms. Keywords: McDowell, epistemology, perception, Crispin Wright, Mark Johnston,

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Full Book Contents

Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism

Part I Perception

1 Hinton and the Origins of Disjunctivism

3 Against Disjunctivism

4 Disjunctivism about Visual Experience

5 Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination

6 How to Account for Illusion

7 Disjunctivism and Discriminability

8 The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination

Part II Action

9 Disjunctive Theories of Perception and Action

10 A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons

11 On How to Act—Disjunctively

Part III Knowledgement

12 McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism

13 In Defence of Disjunctivism

14 Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge

15 Starting Afresh Disjunctively: Perceptual Engagement with the World

16 The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument

17 Comment on John McDowell's ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument’

Index

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